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Abstract: In the heavy industry, the value of cargo transported by rail is very high. Due to high value, poor security and volume of rail transport, the theft cases are often. 
The main problem of securing rail transport is predicting the location of a high probability of risk. Because of this, the aim of the presented research was to predict the highest 
probability of rail cargo theft for areas. It is important to prevent theft cases by better securing the railway lines. To solve that problem the authors' model was developed. 
The model uses information about past transport cases for the learning process of Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and Machine Learning (ML).The ANN predicted the 
probability for 94.7% of the cases of theft and the Machine Learning identified 100% of the cases. This method can be used to develop a support system for securing the rail 
infrastructure. 
 





Thefts from wagons expose railways to huge losses. 
Therefore, appropriate cargo security is of key importance 
for the entire transport chain [1-3]. The carrier is 
responsible for the cargo from the moment it is accepted 
for transport until its delivery to the recipient. Any damage 
must be paid for; it is often compensated for as part of the 
transport fee [4]. Stolen cargoes cause losses in excess of 
EUR 1.4 million annually in Poland [5]. 
The main products stolen in rail transport in Poland are 
coal and fuels. In the United Kingdom, one of the 
commodities stolen in transport is metal. The British 
government is tightening regulations which apply to scrap-
metal dealers to prevent metal theft, control urban areas, 
industry, other offences and road accessibility [6]. In the 
United States of America, the government is working hard 
to protect the rail network against all forms of attack [7]. 
The regulations and the possibility of securing cargo are 
described inter alia by [8-10]. However, there are hardly 
any papers on how to predict theft in transport or use 
applicable systems. A method to predict the risk of theft in 
road transport similar to the one presented here was 
described in [11]. Rail carriers do not insure cargoes due to 
the gigantic costs of such insurance and the volumes of 
cargoes transported in a year. 
The cargo transported by the rail could be secured by 
using closed wagons, and using door wiring, but it is a 
method just for slowing down the thief, and it never fully 
secures it. The better solution could use the padlock, but it 
will be problematic (the key or code should be transported 
to the final place, and the process of securing and opening 
the wagon will be complicated. So the technical security of 
wagons just slows down the thieves, and does not scare 
them away. Because of this, the better way is to use the 
drones as a solution to scare, take the pictures as evidence, 
and follow the theft. So that solution helps to avoid the theft 
or catch the thief. But with regards to the cost of that 
solution, it could not be used to monitor all transports. 
Because of that the method to identify the riskiest cases 
should be developed.  
The aim of this research was to analyse the possibilities 
of using archive information about transport, transport 
theft, current transported type of cargo, value and to predict 
the possibility of theft. In the paper, the ANN and LM 
method and the correlation of the input data with the results 
were examined. To achieve the goals the analysis of 
archive theft cases was done. In the next chapter authors 
present the theft cases that occurred in Poland, and the 
importance of the problem. 
The ANN and ML methods were considered in the 
research, because of the complexity of the problem, high 
uncertainty, variety of transport processes and a number of 
data. The literature study proves that ANN and ML method 
can be successfully used for similar cases. The ANN is a 
very powerful tool with a wide range of application, like: 
transportation [12-14], vehicle routing [15], railway [16], 
electricity [17], hazardous risk [18] etc. In a different area 
of research, but also with the complexity of the problem, 
variety or uncertainty, this method helps to achieve good 
results. 
 
2 IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
According to the information provided by PKP Cargo, 
the highest number of thefts occurs in Silesia - about 
65÷70% of the total figure for Poland. In 2014, PKP Cargo 
recorded 1637 incidents related to thefts on the tracks. The 
value of the stolen goods was estimated at EUR 1.5 million. 
The area of Silesia is of key importance for rail transport in 
Poland because 60 percent of domestic and 70 percent of 
export consignments are sent from there [19]. 
Thieves steal goods from wagons not only during 
longer stops of trains, e.g. on railway sidings. Often a short 
stop before a semaphore or even slower train speed is 
enough. They try to open wagons and snatch the cargo after 
the train departs. Cargoes are protected by the Railway 
Protection Guards (SOK). 
The following measures are applied to make cargoes 
more difficult to steal: painting with lime, wiring of 
wagons, monitoring of wagons with drones.  
To protect consignments against theft, PKP Cargo uses 
two types of drones reaching a speed of 60 km/h. The 
technique enables sending the image in real time to the 
headquarters of the Threat Prevention Team. PKP Cargo 
uses Phantom III and Eagle drones. Phantom III drones are 
equipped with a 4K camera. Their task is to perform patrol 
flights of PKP Cargo trains and thus to prevent train 
stoppages by thieves. There are many ways of stopping 
trains - tipping coal, damaging wagons or placing blocks 
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on tracks. When a train stops, the drone records everything 
that is happening around. The task of Eagle drones is to 
patrol large areas from a high altitude, with two cameras. 
Thieves have something to fear because one camera 
provides very good quality images of faces even from 
several hundred meters. The other camera - a thermal 
imaging one - offers the possibility of night patrols. The 
operator is able to recognize a human figure from a 
distance of up to two kilometres. 
With the use of drone-based surveillance, the number 
of theft cases decreased by 55%. After 10 months of using 
drones, the number of thefts in 2015 dropped to 1044, and 
the losses were estimated at EUR 0.75 million [19]. The 
share of PKP Cargo in the rail freight market in Poland is 
44% [20]. 
According to a rail transport safety report produced by 
the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) in 2018, the number of 
offences and incidents decreased by approximately 33% 
[21]. 
Attacks on trains to steal cargo are usually scheduled– 
thieves know when and what train will be carrying valuable 
commodities. Therefore, their actions are usually well 
planned. Thefts are frequent when trains stop (due to 
blockades on the tracks and during planned stopovers). In 
addition, thefts occur also while the train is in motion – in 
such a case, the cargo is tipped from the wagons onto the 
track. For example, in 2014, PKP Cargo S.A. recorded theft 
of over 8000 tonnes of cargo [22] which, in relation to the 
transported 109.59 million tonnes [23] accounted for 
0.75% of all transported goods. 
 
 
Figure 1 Barricade on the track forcing the train to stop; wagons are opened to 
attempt to steal the cargo [19] 
 
Tab. 1 presents the volume of cargoes transported by 
rail in Poland in 2017 and 2018. The grey rows mark the 
most frequent thefts. An analysis of quarterly fluctuations 
for particular product groups in a year indicated that they 
do not exceed 2.95%, therefore in rail transport, seasonality 
can be considered marginal. 
Other groups presented in Tab. 1, according to the NST 
classification (percentages according to transport work) 
included: 
• food, beverages and tobacco products - 0.49% 
• textiles and clothing, leather and leather products - 
0.01% 
• wood, wood and cork products, straw, paper and paper 
products, printing products and recordings - 1.06% 
• products made from other non-metallic raw materials 
- 1.47% 
• machinery, electrical and electronic equipment -  
0.07% 
• transport equipment - 0.55% 
• furniture, other finished goods - 0.16% 
• secondary raw materials, municipal waste - 1.58% 
• letters, parcels and courier parcels - less than 0.001% 
• empty packaging - 0.75% 
• cargoes transported, other non-tradeable cargoes - less 
than 0.001% 
• mixed goods, excluding food - 33% 
• unidentifiable goods - 8.51% 
• other goods - 0.62% 
 
Table 1 Rail transport in Poland in 2018 
Cargo type Share by transport work 
Avg. dist. 
 of 1 tonne 
mln.t % mln. tkm % km 
Hard coal, lignite, oil 
and natural gas 66 39 10673 27 160 
Metal ores, mining and 
quarrying products 46 27 11796 29 251 
Briquettes, refined 
petroleum products 18 10 6051 15 330 
Chemicals, chemical 
products 6 3 2170 5 333 
Metals, readymade 
metal products 7 4 1796 4 252 
Other groups according 
to NST classification 21.85 13 6910 17 314 
 
Delays in deliveries are important from the viewpoint 
of efficient operation of the transport chain. Unfortunately, 
rail transport cannot be said to be highly punctual. 
According to the data provided by the Railway Transport 
Office (UTK), in 2018 the punctuality rate for freight 
deliveries was only 38% in domestic traffic and 28% in 
international traffic which, with an average delay time of 
586 minutes in domestic traffic and 438 minutes in 
international traffic, is a major rail problem. In addition, 
due to the low speed of trains and numerous stops, there is 
an increased risk of cargo theft. Train delays are shown in 
Tab. 2. 
 
Table 2 Train delays [24] 
Delays Number of delayed trains 
Proportion of 
delayed trains 
up to 4 minutes 59 sec 832 0.70% 
5 minutes - 59 minutes 59 sec 9097 7.64% 
60 minutes - 119 minutes 59 sec 8029 6.74% 




The industry meetings help to identify the problem of 
locating the riskiest areas to monitor them by the drones. 
Many company representatives said that it was not possible 
because of the costs to monitor each transport. And because 
of that, the main problem is to identify the places where the 
theft probability is the highest. Based on this, authors 
developed a method of predicting the theft probability with 
regards, inter alia, to the type of wagon, type of cargo, area, 
route, method of securing the wagon, organizing the 
transport process and more. There is a real demand for this 
research and theft prediction method. 
To be able to predict when and where thefts of cargoes 
in rail transport may occur, an analytical model using 
artificial neural networks was proposed. The main factors 
affecting the occurrence of thefts were also identified. The 
input was based on statistical data presented in the UTK 
and PKP Cargo S.A. reports. The model which was 
developed could generate 10,000 transport cases. The data 
showed 0.73% theft cases which, in comparison with 
0.75% of real cases, is a confirmation of the model's good 
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representation of reality. The input data were compiled in 
the following way: 
• P1 - type of cargo. According to the data [3], thefts of 
coal concerned 65÷70% of all cases; normal 
distribution was used to generate the data with an 
interval of 1÷5: 
- Aggregates - marked 1 
- Metals - marked 2 
- Coal - marked 3 
- Fuels - marked 4 
- Other goods - marked 5 
 
( )11 Min 4; Max(1; ( (); 3; 5 3)) ; 0P Z F R− =                (1) 
 
• P2 - Type of wagons (2), based on data with the largest 
market share in 2017 [11], [17]: 
- Wagons of the normal type E - marked as 1, wagons of 
the special type F - marked as 2, number of used 
wagons type E and F: 58657 pcs 
- tank cars type Z - marked as 3, number of wagons 
operated: 7142 pieces 
- wagons with sliding roof type T - marked as 4, wagons 
with sliding walls S - marked as 5, a number of used 
wagons type T and S, approx.: 3253 pcs 
 
(1; 2) 1 1 for 1 3
(4; 5) for 1 2
2 3 for 1 4  
(1; 5) for 1 5









                              (2) 
 
• P3 - Train speed (3). According to UTK data, the 
average speed of freight trains in 2017 was 25.1 km / 
h [18], so for generating data, the normal distribution 
was used with the interval 20÷30 km / h 
 
( )13 Min 30; Max(10; ( (); 25 1; 4)) ; 0P Z F R .− =           (3) 
 
• P4 - Method of securing the wagons (4): 
- No protection - marked as 0, 
- Indication of the load with lime - marked as 1, 
- Wagon wiring - marked as 2, 
- Increased SOK control - marked as 3, 
- Drones monitoring - marked as 4. 
 
4 (0; 4)P Rz=                                                                 (4) 
 
• P5 - Travel time at night (5), assumed as a percentage 
of the total route 
 
5 (1; 100)P Rz=                                                              (5) 
 
• P6 - Region (6), was established in accordance with 
the administrative division of Poland: 
- Lower Silesia- marked as 2, 
- Kuyavian-Pomeranian - marked as 7, 
- Lublin Voivodeship - marked as 8, 
- Lubusz Voivodeship - marked as 9, 
- Lodz Voivodeship - marked as 10, 
- Lesser Poland - marked as 3, 
- Masovian - marked as 11, 
- Opole Voivodeship - marked as 6, 
- Subcarpathian - marked as 12, 
- Podlasie - marked as 13, 
- Pomeranian - marked as 5, 
- Silesian - marked as 1, 
- Swietokrzyskie Voivodeship - marked as 14, 
- Warmia-Masurian - marked as 15, 
- Greater Poland - marked as 4, 
- West Pomeranian - marked as 16. 
 
6 (1; 16)P Rz=                                                                (6) 
 
• P7 - Distance (7), base on the UTK data [25] the 
average distance of freight transport was 228.5 km in 
2017, therefore a normal distribution in the interval 
was used to generate data. 100÷600 km 
 
( )17 Min 600; Max(100; ( (); 228 5; 190)) ; 0P Z F R .− =   (7) 
 
• P8 - Number of planned stops (8), the generated data 
was assumed in the range 1÷10, 
 
8 (1; 10)P Rz=                                                                (8) 
 
• P9 - Number of unplanned stops and delays (9), train 
delays were based on data from table 2 [24], the 
following delay intervals have been assumed: 
- up to 4 minutes 59 sec - marked as 1, 
- about 5 minutes - 59 minutes 59 sec - marked as 2, 
- about 60 minutes - 119 minutes 59 sec - marked as 3, 
- over 120 minutes - marked as 4, 
- arrival in accordance with the plan - marked as 5. 
 
( )19 Min 5; Max(0; ( (); 3 4; 0 7)) ; 0P Z F R . .− =             (9) 
 
3.1 Data Preparation for the Artificial Neural Network 
 
For every P1÷P9 parameter, the appropriate factor to 
determine theft probability was estimated. This was done 
using Eqs. (10) - (18): 
 
{ }
0 7 for 1 3
0 4 for 1 2; 4
1 0 2 for 1 1  
0 1 for 1 5










                                           (10) 
{ }
0 7 for 2 1
0 2 for 2 3
2 0 4 for 2 2
0 2 for 2 4; 5










                                           (11) 
33 1 ; 2
30
PW Z  = − 
 
                                                      (12) 
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0 7 for 4 0
0 7 for 4 1
0 5 for 4 2
4
0 4 for 4 3
0 3 for 4 4













                                                 (13) 
55 ; 2
250
PW Z  =  
 
                                                         (14) 
0 7 for 6 1
0 6 for 6 2
6
0 5 for 3 6 6







 ==  ≤ ≤

                                            (15) 
77 ; 2
6000
PW Z  =  
 
                                                       (16) 
88
20
PW =                                                                       (17) 
0 05 for 9 1
0 1 for 9 2
9 0 2 for 9 3
0 3 for 9 4









                                                 (18) 
 
Based on the W1÷W9 factors, the target value was 
calculated. To calibrate the model for reproducing real 
statistical data to the maximum, the additional factor Cf was 
estimated. This factor was used to sort a number of risky 
cases by the highest risk probability. The Cf factor was 






count realRiskyCases count w C
=
 = ≥ 
 





















                                      (20) 
 
 For the model presented, the value 0,01065 for Cf  was 
determined. 
For the ANN learning process, the following set of 
teaching data was compiled: 
• 70% of the collection - teaching data, 
• 15% of the collection - validation data, 
• 15% of the set - test data. 
 
During data preparation, the following Matlab 
functions were used: 
• Mapminmax - normalizing the input values to the 
range of −1, 1 (acceleration of calculations), 
• Removeconstantrows - removal of input vectors 
consisting of the same values. 
 
Figure 2 Method of theft probability prediction 
 
The authors decided to develop a new method to 
predict theft cases in rail transport in the supply chain. One 
of the good tools which can be used for this is the Artificial 
Neural Network (ANN) and Machine Learning (ML). In 
this chapter, the authors show their method to predict 
disruptions in road transport by using the Matlab ANN 
Toolbox and the Classification Learner in Matlab. This 
method consists of two steps: ANN/ML learning, 
Simulation of theft probability. 
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Fig. 2 shows the method,which was developed to 
estimate the probability of the occurrence of the theft risk 
and its potential foundation. The Matlab R2015 software 
was used to model the Artificial Neural Networks and 
Machine Learning. 
As a first step, it was necessary to create a database 
containing data such as transport parameters and cases of 
theft. The transport parameters may include the cargo type, 
type of wagons, train speed, method of securing the 
wagons, travel time at night, region, distance, number of 
planned stops and the time of stops and delays. Based on 
this information, the probability of transported cargo theft 
was determined. 
 




















































































P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 
3 1 28 1 14 4 205 2 3 0 
3 1 18 3 58 1 100 10 4 1 
 
In the simulation, a feed-forward network was used. 
The research applied a different ANN structure. For 
Machine Learning, a different algorithm was used. Tab. 4 
presents some of the analysed variants. In the transport, 
parameters such as cargo type (P1), type of wagons (P2), 
train speed (P3), method of securing the wagons (P4), 
travel time at night as percentage of total route time (P5), 
region (P6), distance (P7), number of planned stops (P8) 
and the time of stops and delays (P9) were used as the 
learning input data for ANN and ML. For the learning 
target, theft cases were applied and calculated using the 
formula (target). Every case of transport was represented 
as a vector. The examples of data used in the training are 
presented in Tab. 3.  
In Tab. 4 is presented basic statistical information for 
training dataset. The value in each column was described 
at the beginning of the Methodology chapter. 
 




















































































P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 
Median 3 2 25 2 50 8 230 6 3 
Min 1 1 10 0 1 1 100 1 1 
Max 4 5 30 4 100 16 600 10 5 
 
In real data, theft occurs in just 0.75% of the total 
number of cases. Because the overall accuracy could be 
high and the identification of theft cases could be poor, in 
order to make sure that the method generates a good return, 
the accuracy for theft cases must be considered.  
The analysed variants presented in Tab. 5 differ in their 
overall accuracy and the accuracy for theft cases. It could 
be seen that for No. 1 (Tab. 5) the ANN method with 3 
hidden layers of 9 neurons each, the overall accuracy is 
very high (99.3%) but the theft accuracy is 0%. The best 
results were achieved by using a simple ANN with 9 
neurons in two hidden layers and the Machine Learning by 
Boosted Trees. It gave a 100% accuracy for theft cases. 
 
Table 5 Analysed variant for the learning process 
No. Method Parameters Overall Accuracy 
Accuracy for Theft 
cases 
1 ANN No. 1 3 layers of 9 neurons each 99.3% 0.0% 
2 ANN No. 2 1 layer of 9 neurons 98.6% 94.7% 
3 ANN No. 3 2 layers of 9 neurons each 87.8% 98.4% 
4 ML, Weighted KNN Number of Neighbours: 10; Distance Metric: Euclidean; Distance Weight: Squared Inverse 99.4% 16.7% 
5 ML, Weighted KNN Number of Neighbours: 10; Distance Metric: Cosine; Distance Weight: Squared Inverse 99.4% 33.3% 
6 ML, Fine KNN Number of Neighbours: 1; Distance Metric: Correlation; Distance Weight: Squared Inverse 99.2% 55.6% 
7 ML, Fine KNN Number of Neighbours: 1; Distance Metric: Euclidean; Distance Weight: Equal 99.2% 38.9% 
8 ML, Cubic SVM Kernel Function: Cubic; Box Constraint Level: 1; Kernel Scale Mode: Auto 100.0% 77.8% 
9 ML, Cubic SVM Kernel Function: Quadratic; Box Constraint Level: 100; Kernel Scale Mode: Auto 100.0% 66.7% 
10 ML, Boosted Trees Ensemble method: RUS Boost; Learner Type: Decision Tree; Number of Learners: 200; 87.8% 100.0% 
11 ML, Boosted Trees Ensemble method: Bag; Learner Type: Decision Tree; Number of Learners: 200; 99.7% 66.8% 
 
 
Figure 3 Structure of artificial neural network for case No. 3 
 
The selection of the Artificial Neural Network 
structure was based on the method of subsequent 
approximations. The artificial neural network which was 
created consists of one hidden layer of 9 neurons and one 
output layer. 
 
( )w 3 2 13 2 2 1 11 1 3( ), , ,f LW f LW f IW b b y = + + = a p     (21) 
 
where: R - number of elements in input vector; S - number 
of neurons in layer; a - neuron output vector; IW - initial 
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weights; LW - layer weights; p - vector of R input elements; 




Figure 4 MSE error during the training of artificial neural network for case No. 3 
 
The Levenberg-Marquardt backpropagation method 
was used as the learning algorithm. As an activation 
function, the tangensoidal function was used. The biggest 
neural network examined in the research gives the worst 
results. The network structure was selected on the basis of 
the mean square error (MSE) which was about 0.00051118 
(Fig. 4). 
The results achieved in the training, the validation and 
testing of neural network processes are presented in Fig. 5. 
For Machine Learning, the Boosted Trees method was 
used. For its configuration, the RUS Boost ensemble 
method with 200 number of learners was used. Fig. 6 
presents the ROC Curve for the ensemble method. 
Fig. 6 indicates that the Machine Learning method 
generates high quality results. 
 
 
Figure 5 Regression plot for training, validation and testing of ANN or case No. 
3 
 




The methodology presented in the previous chapter 
was used to predict the theft probability for each rail cargo 
transport. The simulation used 10 000 sample transport 
cases characterized by the parameters as described 
(P1÷P9). In that sample, 75 theft cases occurred. The ANN 
predicted the probability for 94.7% of the cases of theft and 
the Machine Learning identified 100% of the cases. The 
method also predicted theft in cases where they do not 
occur in reality. That area is potentially risky and the 
railway infrastructure should be monitored there. That will 




Figure 7 Results of theft prediction by the best-used method 
 
In the cases of cargo transport under analysis, it was 
always coal that was stolen from standard E type wagons. 
To predict thefts from other cargo types, the input data set 
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must be bigger and they must represent more cases of theft. 
With the absence of such information in the reports, such 
cases cannot be simulated. 
Theft cargo cases were detected for six Voivodships 
(P6); in those regions, the biggest number of incidents 
occurred in real data (1 - Silesian: 24 cases, 2 - Lower 
Silesian: 15 cases, 3 - Lesser Poland: 7 cases, 4 - Greater 
Poland: 14 cases, 5 - Pomeranian: 7 cases, 6 - Opole: 8 
cases). The cases detected in correlation with the number 
of stops and distances are presented in Fig. 8. 
 
 
Figure 8 Predicted theft cases by the number of stops and distance 
 
The correlation of theft cases to the train speed and 
travel time at night is presented in Fig. 9.  
 
 
Figure 9 Predicted theft cases by train speed and travel time at night  
 
The average transport speed was about 21 km/h, with 
a minimum of 15 km/h and a maximum of 29 km/h. Most 
cases occurred at night - about 76% of the route was during 
the night. The average distance was 276.4 km. 25 thefts 
were done during scheduled stops, and 80% occurred at 
eight or more stops. 45 thefts happened during unscheduled 
stops longer than 120 minutes, 27 cases at stops between 





Cargo thefts are never accidental. Thieves plan to steal 
cargo from rail wagons taking many factors into 
consideration beforehand. They steal coal and similar 
commodities, which are easy to sell in the black market. 
Also it is easy to drop that cargo down from stopped 
wagons and take it directly to pick-up vehicles or dump it 
from moving wagons on the trackway and load it later onto 
the vehicles. Thieves plan their actions to happen at night 
and in unsecured areas to reduce the risk of being detected 
by railway security guards. There is no chance to monitor 
all wagons and infrastructure during transport so railway 
security guards do it randomly. The presented method 
based on ANN predicted the probability for 94.7% of the 
cases of theft and the Machine Learning identified 100% 
of the cases. There is no similar method or system, so the 
presented approach and research are innovative. 
The method also predicted theft in cases where they do 
not occur in reality. That area is potentially risky and the 
railway infrastructure should be monitored there. That will 
reduce the number of theft cases. The method presented 
here can be used to develop a system for identifying high-
risk places, the transport and the time of potential thefts. 
This type of system is needed by rail cargo forwarders and 
railway carriers, the infrastructure managers and transport 
planners. The implementation of such a system will help 
schedule infrastructure patrols. 
In future research, the presented method will be tested 
in a railway carrier company to improve the prediction 
method. And after confirmation of the high quality of the 
developed model, work will be started to raise funds for the 
development of the system based on the presented method. 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
Z(x; n) - rounds the number x to n decimal digits 
Min(a1; a2; ... an) - selects the smallest number from the 
string of numbers a1; a2; ... an 
Max(a1; a2; ... an) - selects the largest number from the 
sequence of numbers a1; a2; ... an 
R() - argument less function, gives a real random number 
with a uniform (rectangular) distribution from the interval 
<0; 1). The random number generator of the spreadsheet is 
used to receive it by MS Excel in regards to the algorithm 
Mersenne Twister (MT19937)) 
Rz(x1; x2) - function giving a random integer from the range 
<x1; x2> 
F−1(p; µ; σ) - inverse distribution of normal distribution, 
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